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Connolly: Connolly on Richman

Michèle H. Richman, Sacred Revolutions: Durkheim and the College of Sociology.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. 248 pp. ISBN 0816639744 (paper).
Reviewed by Sean P. Connolly, Cornell University
Michèle Richman's recent book, Sacred Revolutions: Durkheim and the College of Sociology,
examines the critical impact of early French sociology on the culture, politics, and intellectual
history of twentieth-century France and beyond. Departing from French sociologist Emile
Durkheim's monumental study of aboriginal religious practices, The Elementary Forms of
Religious Life, Richman assesses French sociology's effects on the avant-garde, argues for its
revolutionary politics, and considers its lasting philosophical import for modern-day human
sciences and political revolt. Her study is as interdisciplinary as it is broad, attending to the
demands of the various disciplines it traverses—including sociology, history, literary, cultural
and modernist studies—without the disciplinary privileging or distillation one might assume.
This fact, however, does not compromise the book's importance for these disciplines; on the
contrary, it reveals their amorphous boundaries and blind spots, encouraging them to expand
their reach, address one another, and make new disciplines possible. Such is the endeavor, the
merit, and, indeed, the risk that this book takes. Some of Richman's more radical claims for
French sociology and its legacy, indeed, will not be met without skepticism. Nevertheless, such a
risk makes Sacred Revolutions a book for anyone in or among the fields of European intellectual
history, French studies, modernist studies, critical theory, or sociology.
Richman opens her study by addressing a curious comment by French critic and writer Jean
Wahl in 1937, made in response to the intellectual prominence sociology had recently acquired:
Here is this sociology, of which I was never a very devoted follower, taking hold of young minds
that are eager for rigor, who think they have found in it answers for questions they previously
thought could be resolved by surrealism, by revolution, or by Freudianism. We must try to
understand this phenomenon, which is itself sociological. (2)
Indeed, among these unresolved questions, questions left unanswerable (as the comment implies)
by a dogmatic brand of Bretonianism, were the following: Is it possible to conceive of social
existence without the hierarchy and alienation implied by statehood and individualism? Are there
forms of social organization that do not betray their communal origins in a "head of state" or, in
Weberian terms, a "charismatic leader"? What would such a society be, and how could it critique
and redress the rise of fascism and totalitarianism, characterized as they were by such leaders? Is
it possible to realize a society "without a head," so to speak? Against the backdrop of such
questions, the self-proclaimed secret society "Acephale" (Grk. acephalos, "headless") and its
public face, the College of Sociology, which included such figures as Georges Bataille, Pierre
Klossowski, Roger Caillois, and Alexandre Kojève, sought to theorize and enact a social mode
of being that would preserve community while avoiding the persistent corporatism, hierarchy,
militarism, and utilitarianism characteristic of modern societies and fascism. Though the
collegians were not sociologists à la lettre, their conception of community, Richman argues,
derives primarily from early French sociology and the work of its founder, Emile Durkheim.
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In the first chapter of Sacred Revolutions, Richman considers Durkheim's "sociological
revolution" which, she argues, finds its most poignant expression in his 1912 Elementary Forms
of Religious Life. Durkheim's brand of sociology, she contends, was revolutionary not only
within the field of sociology but within the human sciences in general, which, at that time, were
closely linked to historical and literary studies couched in the ideological rhetoric of great
authors and individuals. In this chapter, Richman offers a comprehensive reading of Durkheim's
career, highlighting the political and philosophical consequences of his axiomatic claim that
social life is of a sui generis nature, to be considered independently of individual persons or
psychic causality. Among Durkheim's many revolutionary claims in the Elementary Forms is
that all forms of social existence and group formation have, at their foundation, practices
deriving from religious origin. In this sense, "religion" and "society" are apparently synonymous
for Durkheim. A tribe or clan—or any society, for that matter—recognizes its social unity
through means of a tribal practice, rite, or ritual such as sacrifice, where taboos are lifted and the
collective's "sacred" or "holy" power is witnessed, seizing consciousness and leaving an indelible
imprint of the collective, a "prise de conscience," on the mind of the individual. Conscious
recognition of the collective through such a rite effects a "conscience collective," wherein each
dialectically recognizes the other as the other does oneself. The rite and its ceremonial objects,
which eventually precipitate such consciousness, come to symbolically represent the
transcendent unity of the group and the "holy" or "sacred" power that permeates and binds it. The
social élan of these ceremonies and the social recognition they cause are instances of what
Durkheim called "collective effervescence." Richman argues for the radical significance of this
concept, which, she claims, transcends sociological case studies and has enduring importance as
a theoretical lens for understanding group behavior of all kinds, including that of the Paris
uprisings of May 1968. Through this lens, sociological consideration of such group behavior
might highlight its revolutionary political potential. "Rather than paralyze individuals with
evidence of social determinism," she argues, "the role of sociological intervention would be to
accentuate the possibilities opened by social forms, especially those collective encounters
associated with effervescent moments of intense social creativity and transformation" (39). For
Richman, collective effervescence is not merely a theoretical construct, however; she historicizes
Durkheim's sociological concept by juxtaposing it against the expansive fascist group uprisings
of the 1930s and other, earlier examinations of group behavior such as Gustav Le Bon's wellknown studies in crowd psychology (1895). Ultimately, collective effervescence is valorized for
what the author perceives to be its revolutionary quality of sustained resistance to social
normativity. For readers of Durkheim, this is indeed one of the most contentious claims of
Sacred Revolutions.
The second chapter, "Savages in the Sorbonne," considers the French academy's troubled relation
to sociology and Durkheimianism from the late years of the Third Republic until the eve of
WWII. Among impediments to sociology's secure posture among the human sciences were its
uncanny proximity to ethnology, its apparent lack of direct empirical field research, and its
apparent romanticism directed toward archaic societies. The most significant obstacle was
political, however. According to Richman, Durkheim's views on sociological method and their
philosophical implications compromised long-held ideological views in France concerning the
privileged, ideological status of literature within the human sciences. More specifically, it was
the status of French literature and history that served as the basis for the "sociological" study of
man in general. Durkheim's claim that sociological method demanded a divorce from the literary
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paradigm and therefore challenged not only the normative definition of proper education, but
also the nationalism and gallocentrism such education promoted. In response to this threat, a
"counterrevolution" against Durkheimianism was initiated by Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde,
authors of the pamphlet "L'esprit de la nouvelle Sorbonne," which defended the primacy of
literature for education and the cultivation of moral values. Durkheim parried these efforts,
Richman explains, by seeking the disciplinary intersections of sociology and literature in, for
example, the social and historical context of literary works, and by enlisting the help of literary
figures who conceived literature sociologically as the "symbol of the collective life of a nation."
The breach sociology effected within the human sciences and the challenge it posed to French
intellectualism in general ultimately made its acceptance problematic. This fact, compounded by
the rise in social psychoanalysis (Freud's Massenpsychologie), the controversial political
significance of crowd assemblies later in the 1930s, and the methodological difficulties
acknowledged since its emergence, destined the comparative sociology of Durkheim and his
nephew, Marcel Mauss, to have a troubled status in French intellectual history. Nevertheless,
their studies of archaic societies and their theories of socialization were paradigmatic for the
College of Sociology. The College contended that a restoration of "sacred" social intimacy, one
modeled on the effervescent rituals of archaic societies, would be ameliorative to the progressive
instrumentality and devaluation of human life in modern societies. This "sacred sociology,"
Richman contends, extended French sociology's philosophical import and politically
counteracted the rise of fascism, capitalism, and corporatism of all kinds.
The third chapter focuses precisely on these politics. In "Politics and the Sacred in the College of
Sociology," Richman critically positions sociology's theories of group phenomena within the
historical context of Leon Bourgeois' leftist/syndicalist solidarity, on the one hand, and the
warnings of Le Bon and Tarde's crowd psychology on the other. Contrary to the latter,
Durkheimianism argued for the strengthening and normalization of society via crowd assembly,
which would seem, according to Richman's characterization, to serve the interests of revolution,
socialism, and the left. This is not the case, however. Drawing upon writings by sociologist
Robert Hertz and Georges Bataille, she distinguishes between the "right" and "left-sacred," that
is, the qualitative differences in social unity between conservative, republican groups and that of
radical groups. In his famous essay "The Psychological Structure of Fascism," Bataille explains
that whereas the fascist-right defends and maintains a form of social homogeneity against the
threat of radical "heterogeneous" elements, the left unites these elements without homogenizing
them under a transcendent collective. By continually defining itself against homogeneity,
Bataille's argument implies that the left can maintain sacred social intimacy without
compromising its heterogeneity or, therefore, perpetuating social marginalization. Richman
argues that the left-sacred characterizing French sociology and the College is to be distinguished
from both the Le Bonian crowd and Bourgeoisian solidarity. The left-sacred would be a "sacred
force capable of sustaining the negativity of its otherness and of resisting the recuperative
strategy that directs it toward conservation, accumulation, and profit" (129). Sustaining such a
"sacred force" through collective recognition would restore social bonds by "mobiliz[ing]," says
Richman, "the energies liberated by such a recognition" (144). The politics of the sacred and the
College, in effect, liberate man from the solipsism, utility, and profanation of the individual and
the state.
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The fourth chapter, "Sacrifice in Art and Eroticism," is at once a history and defense of the
College's attempt to resacralize modern society through "sacrificial" conceptions of art and
eroticism. Drawing upon Mauss' account of sacrifice as a "fait social total"—a social
phenomenon that at once comprehensively binds the people of a society and their varied
economic, political, and moral activities—College members sought to manifest sacrifice itself in
various artistic and erotic forms in order to foster a sacred society. Indeed, this is what
distinguished the College's practice of a "sacred sociology" from the scientific goals of
Durkheim and the sociology of religion. Michel Leiris, along with French artist André Masson,
for example, wedded literature, eroticism, and the theatre of bullfighting in his L'age d'homme
and Miroir de la tauromachie. Alternatively, George Bataille's radical conception of the sacred
and sacrifice as kinds of radical expenditure (dépense) enabled him to associate these to ecstatic
forms of all kinds, including laughter, tears, excreta, and sexual acts. Bataille was committed
unwaveringly to this ecstatic notion of the sacred, which could only be realized by means of a
violent, prodigal expenditure for which sacrifice was the model. Michel Surya's voluminous
biography notes, for example, that Bataille offered to sacrifice his own life at a meeting of the
Acephale group. (See Michel Surya, Georges Bataille: la mort à l'oeuvre or the recent English
translation by Krzystof Kijalkowski and Michael Richardson, Bataille: An Intellectual
Biography.) In contrast to sacrifice, art, Bataille argued, betrays such useless expenditure, being
partly a form of work. As Richman explains, for Bataille, "sacrifice is no longer understood as
the endpoint of the sacred so much as its condition of possibility" (173). His radical views
occasioned factionalism within the College, challenging its endeavor not only to theorize but to
enact a "sacred society." Richman underscores his disagreements with Roger Caillois, for
example, which were evident in his review of Caillois' important book L'homme et le sacré.
Whatever the difference among the College's members, however, the author maintains that the
lasting importance of the College resides in its analysis of the sacred/profane polarity of social
existence, its response to the progressive evanescence of the sacred in modern societies, and its
insistence that the loss of the sacred diminishes in its turn the transformative, revolutionary
potential of collective effervescence.
The postscript, "Effervescence from May '68 to the Present," considers the lasting intellectual
and political relevance of the sacred and collective effervescence for the modern day. In response
to Jurgen Habermas' dismissal of Bataille and his epigones as antipragmatic, "manichean," and
"antimodern," Richman argues somewhat tendentiously that these supposed faults are actually its
merits; sacred sociology endeavored precisely to rescue humanity from the militant utilitarianism
and profanation of modern life. As Sacred Revolutions explains throughout, this was the political
and cultural function of sociology in general: to serve as a critical and ameliorative sociopolitical discourse, a corrective lens as it were, fostered dialectically through the study of foreign
autochthonous cultures. This lens is no less useful today, maintains Richman. The sacred, for
example, "stands as a social phenomenon neither to be revered for its venerable antecedents in
antiquity nor reviled for its association with primitives—both gestures robbing it of relevance in
the present" (211). To maintain the sacred intimacy of social life, one must defend and maintain
what Richman calls the "socio-logic of effervescence," according to which revolutionary social
uprisings such as that of Paris '68—a modern version of effervescent assembly—might serve to
restore the lost, sacred sense of community.
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The fulcrum of the book, from start to finish, is its claim for the socio-political importance of
collective effervescence. Richman's personal claim for it is, again, that it causes a potentially
revolutionary social metamorphosis, one which serves moreover as the conditio sin qua non of
social movements in general: "This transformation constitutes the precondition for social and
political movements" (5). This metaphysical claim is among the most intriguing and radical in
Sacred Revolutions. Indeed, she acknowledges that this claim departs considerably from that of
standard readings of effervescence and Durkheim's magnum opus. "Such readings," she argues,"
"devalue Elementary Form's radical potential" (15). It would be interesting, therefore, to
investigate how far she departs from such readings and to what degree she transforms collective
effervescence into a more idiosyncratic metaphysical concept of political revolution.
To begin, Richman convincingly argues that collective effervescence manifests a new paradigm
of human social existence wherein the individual is no longer opposed to the group. Rather, they
find synergy in Durkheim's composite idea of man as homo-duplex: an integral being at once
social and individual, at once the whole society and one of its constituent parts. The value of
homo-duplex, as Richman rightly observes, is that it eschews the naive antagonism between
nature and nurture, the alienated individual and oppressive social forces, favoring a more
interdependent, dialectical relationship. As Durkheim says in Sociology and Philosophy, for
example, "the individual submits to society, and this submission is the condition of his
liberation" (106; translation mine).
This is not to say that liberation entails passive acceptance of society, however; on the contrary,
liberation can only have meaning vis-à-vis the social link that binds all men as homo-duplex. The
upshot of this dialectic is that social change never entirely departs from ongoing, ameliorative
social normalization. "Society" is both the means and the ends of any detraction from society.
Indeed, it is possible to make the paradoxical claim that, for Durkheim, anomie is always already
nomos. If, then, normativity is the ultimate end of society, anomie and social unrest would seem,
on the contrary, to be its side-effect or necessary evil. It is easy therefore to understand the
conservatism and republicanism associated with Durkheim's thought and what critics have called
his tendentious "social metaphysic." Normativity, for Durkheim, is at once the principle and fons
et origo of society itself. Collective effervescence would seem to be, therefore, the means
through which this social normativity is achieved and reinforced, despite the fact that it occurs
usually during transient moments of taboo ritual and non-normative social behavior.
Thus the challenge posed by Richman's account. Instead of a practice serving normative ends,
collective effervescence in Sacred Revolutions is a kind of valorized metaphysics of social
revolution. Given Richman's frequent juxtaposition of Bataille and Durkheim, this new
conception of collective effervescence might be a kind of forced compromise or hybrid between
their respective systems of thought. At times, the author characterizes Durkheim's concept as a
Bataillian or quasi-Nietzschean form of vitalism or amor fati:
Rather than paralyze individuals with evidence of social determinism, the role of sociological
intervention would be to accentuate the possibilities opened by social forms, especially those
collective encounters associated with effervescent moments of intense social creativity and
transformation. (39)
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This re-characterization permits Richman to bridge a potential gap between Durkheim's
sociology and that of Bataille and the College. It also permits her to argue for its enduring
political importance for modern-day revolutionary political movements, such as that of Paris
1968. For reasons given above, however, it would seem that moments of collective
effervescence, for Durkheim at least, are more closely wed to social patterning and normalization
than to "possibility" or "social creativity and transformation."
Perhaps the discrepancy between these differing conceptions is the result of two fundamentally
different interpretive orientations applied to the same social phenomenon: whereas Durkheim
concerned himself with the diachronic effects of effervescent assembly through history, Richman
is more interested in its synchronic qualities, such as its impact on consciousness and temporary
suspension of social norms and taboos. Or, whereas Durkheim's stated purpose is hermeneutical,
that is, to interpret and elaborate the origins of society, Richman's is more poetical, endeavoring
to explain the necessary preconditions for socio-political consciousness and change. Such were
Bataille's own tendencies in his account of "affective effervescence" in "The Psychological
Structure of Fascism." Still, if such a discrepancy is merely a difference in methodological
tendencies, one must wonder about the degree to which such a reorientation on Richman's part
compromises the proposed genealogical link between Durkheim and the College of Sociology.
Indeed, it would initially seem that they are at cross-purposes: whereas Durkheim argued for
enduring nomos and disfavored social change, the College (and especially Bataille), by arguing
for a continual and ongoing social change—vis-à-vis an absolute negativity and potential—
endorsed contrarily a continual state of revolution. If this impression is accurate, and, indeed if
Richman's conception of collective effervescence seems more akin to the latter, one might ask
about the degree to which Richman reads Durkheim through a partisan avant-garde/Bataillian
lens. And, by extension, one might also ask to what degree Durkheim and the College—or by
implication French sociology and the avant-garde—would be comparable if such a lens were
removed.
By tenaciously adhering to the politics of effervescence in particular, Sacred Revolutions
partially eclipses the theoretical significance of many other sociological phenomena of either
equal or greater importance. In the postscript, for example, one might have expected Richman to
take a broader view of French sociology and its perdurable value. Instead of engaging, however,
in a more comprehensive kind of evaluation, her idée fixéeremains the radical politics of
effervescence. One might have considered exactly how, for example, the sacred/profane
vacillation of society takes place today, post 1968. The College presaged the dissolution of the
sacred in the 1940s; what, then, is its current status? It is indeed questionable whether the
sacred/profane binary is applicable at all, given the hegemonic tendency of global capitalism to
banalize and homogenize by reducing everything to commodity and exchange-value. Is this
binary now obsolete, or, if not, have the terms "sacred" and "profane" themselves dramatically
transformed? If so, how is collective effervescence to be understood, and where and when does it
occur? Must we nostalgically recall and reenact the social movements of the sixties, or must new
paradigms of social unity be considered? If sociology's legacy is to endure for the present, it
would seem that these questions should be its concern. Mauss, Durkheim, and the College alike
present ardent critiques of the logic of neoliberalism and its dire social effects. This would be the
likely place where Durkheimianism and the College converge, and this would be the most
convincing presentation of French sociology's critical value today.
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Whatever controversy it provokes, Sacred Revolutions is a well-researched, dense, and extremely
rich study of French sociology and its historical, cultural aftermath. Though other studies have
considered the history of sociology, the College of Sociology, and its prominent figures,
Richman's book is among the first to examine in depth the complicated genealogy of French
sociology from Durkheim to the avant-garde. And, though occasionally burdened by turbulent
prose, Sacred Revolutions clearly opens a new area in comparative studies, provoking many
curious, unexplored questions about modernism, postmodernism, critical theory, and intellectual
history. What, for example, are the politics of Durkheim's thought? In what important ways did
the French avant-garde employ and transform French "comparative" sociology? More broadly,
what is the current relevance of such sociology for the humanities and intellectual history? What
place does it occupy, given extant disciplinary boundaries? What lasting philosophical, cultural,
or political relevance does the College's "sacred sociology" have for modern or postmodern
societies? What is the relation between the sacred and the profane in the current context of
advanced secularism, globalization, global capitalism, and terrorism? Questions such as these,
prompted by Sacred Revolutions, would be the fertile soil of future study and theorizing.
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